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Americans have been shown to attribute greater intentionality to immoral than to amoral
actions in cases of causal deviance, that is, cases where a goal is satisfied in a way
that deviates from initially planned means (e.g., a gunman wants to hit a target and his
hand slips, but the bullet ricochets off a rock into the target). However, past research
has yet to assess whether this asymmetry persists in cases of extreme causal deviance.
Here, we manipulated the level of mild to extreme causal deviance of an immoral versus
amoral act. The asymmetry in attributions of intentionality was observed at all but the
most extreme level of causal deviance, and, as we hypothesized, was mediated by
attributions of blame/credit and judgments of action performance. These findings are
discussed as they support a multiple-concepts interpretation of the asymmetry, wherein
blame renders a naïve concept of intentional action (the outcome matches the intention)
more salient than a composite concept (the outcome matches the intention and was
brought about by planned means), and in terms of their implications for cross-cultural
research on judgments of agency.
Keywords: blame, credit, action, intentional action, causal deviance, moral judgments
Introduction
Reasoning about causes is a fundamental aspect of human cognition. It is unlikely that causal
cognition is a homogeneous phenomenon; the human mind is likely to have different causal
competencies, which draw on different causal concepts or deploy similar causal concepts differently
depending on context (see, e.g., Sperber et al., 1995; Danks et al., 2014). Here, we focus on the
causal competencies deployed in the understanding of agency, both in terms of judging that an
event is an intentional action, and judging that an event is an action at all. Reasoning about causes is
fundamental to such judgments because they require an understanding of the causal links between
mental states, bodily movements and succeeding events in the world, as well as an understanding of
various interfering factors. In this article, we investigate how causal cognition drives judgments of
agency, and how this varies depending on moral context.
We investigate judgments of agency in relation to events involving causal deviance, that is, events
involving causal chains that are initiated by an agent, that lead to the satisfaction of the agent’s
intention, but that do not follow the agent’s plan. For example, an agent intends to hit a target with
his rifle, and indeed does hit the target, but not in the planned manner—instead of the bullet going
directly into the target, it ricochets off a rock and into the target.
Our investigation relates to current work on asymmetries in judgments of intentionality
indicating that people (primarily westerners) tend to judge the same type of action to be intentional
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in moral contexts but unintentional in other contexts (for a
review, see Cova, 2015). In our previous work with an American
sample, we demonstrated this asymmetry in cases of mild causal
deviance, and we argued for a multiple-concepts explanation
in which distinct concepts of intentional action are selected in
different contexts depending on considerations of blame and
credit (see Sousa and Holbrook, 2010; for similar approaches,
see Mele and Cushman, 2007; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007;
Cushman and Mele, 2008; Cova et al., 2012; Lanteri, 2013).
Here, we extend our investigation to cases of more extreme
causal deviance in order to explore further issues concerning
judgments of action performance (i.e., judgments of whether an
event is the action of an agent). With this extension, we shall
explore the potential boundary conditions of the asymmetry in
judgments of intentionality by experimentally probing the extent
to which the asymmetry persists in conditions of extreme causal
deviance.
In the first section, we characterize our multiple-concepts
approach to the asymmetry in judgments of intentionality in
cases of mild causal deviance and its relation to attributions
of blame and credit. In the second section, drawing from our
approach, we characterize our main hypotheses regarding cases
of greater causal deviance. In the third section, we report
an exploratory study of the extent to which judgments of
intentionality and action performance occur at different levels
of mild to extreme causal deviance and across amoral versus
immoral contexts, and discuss its results in terms of our
multiple-concepts approach and alternative explanatory models.
We then point out some of the limitations of our current
results and delineate some future avenues of research, before
concluding with a general remark on pursuing cross-cultural
research on the topic of causal cognition and judgments of
agency.
Polysemy Masks Competing Concepts of
Intentional Action
To illustrate the asymmetry in judgments of intentionality in cases
of mild causal deviance, consider the following parallel scenarios
involving amoral versus immoral shooting:
John desperately wants to win the rifle contest [wants to have
more money]. He knows that he will only win the contest if he
hits the bull’s-eye [that he will inherit a lot of money when his
auntMary dies]. Towin the contest [to kill his aunt], John raises
his brand-new rifle and aims at the bull’s-eye [Mary’s heart],
which is 150 feet away. John has never fired a gun before, and
he has no natural talent for this type of thing. His hand slips
on the barrel of the gun, and the shot goes wild: : : The bullet
hits a rock situated 80 feet in front of John. He assumes he has
completely missed the target. But what a surprise: the bullet
actually bounces off the rock and goes directly into the bull’s-
eye [Mary’s heart].
When asked whether the amoral action hitting the bull’s eye
is intentional, the majority of participants say that it is not
intentional; when asked whether the immoral action hitting the
aunt’s heart is intentional, the great majority of participants affirm
that it is intentional1.
Our multiple-concepts approach to the asymmetry in
judgments of intentionality claims that the expression “intentional
action” (or “acting intentionally”) is polysemous: there are stable
associations in people’s minds between such phrases and
distinct concepts of intentional action, although there may be
substantial individual variation in terms of the relative strength
of each association2. In particular, we claim that two distinct
concepts of intentional action play a role in people’s answers to
the intentionality question in the above scenarios. In the first
concept, which we call the composite concept, an action A of
an agent S is considered intentional only if S had the intention
to A and the causal chain constituting A follows S’s plan to A,
using “plan” in the specific sense of S’s representation of the
intended steps to satisfy S’s intention to A (for a more complete
characterization of this concept, see Sousa and Holbrook, 2010).
With this concept in mind, in both amoral and immoral contexts,
the action hitting the target is to be considered not intentional,
since it does not follow S’s plan to hit the target with the bullet
going directly into the target (i.e., without the ricochet). In the
second concept, which we call the naïve concept, an action A
of an agent S is considered intentional if and only if S had the
intention to A. With this concept in mind, in both amoral and
immoral contexts, the action hitting the target is to be considered
intentional, since it satisfies S’s intention to hit the target.
Consistent with the psychological reality of this polysemy,
when participants judge the action in question to be
unintentional, they justify their judgment by emphasizing
that plan-following is a necessary condition, in accord with
our postulated composite concept. For example (see Sousa and
Holbrook, 2010), they say:
“: : :the means by which he hit the bull’s-eye wasn’t planned,
and so the unintentional means of hitting the bull’s-eye
qualifies the hit as unintentional.”
“It is unintentional that the bullet bounced from the rock to
the heart.”
Moreover, in accord with our postulated naïve concept, when
participants judge the action in question to be intentional, they
justify their answer by emphasizing that plan-following is not a
1This type of case was discussed initially in terms of the relevance of a skill
component to the folk concept of intentional action (see Knobe, 2003; Malle,
2006; see also Malle and Knobe, 1997). However, we have shown that, in these
types of scenarios, what people see as relevant for judging that the action of
hitting the target is unintentional is the presence of causal deviance rather than
the absence of skill qua a dispositional property of the agent (see Sousa and
Holbrook, 2010).
2We have construed the polysemy of “intentional action” in terms of the
expression of different concepts—a pluralist perspective. However, one could
easily reinterpret our discussion of the polysemy at stake here in terms of
the expression of different senses that are aspects of the same concept—a
hybridist perspective. To decide between these two perspectives in relation to
our topic, one would need a consensual criterion to individuate concepts, an
issue without a clear resolution in the psychology of concepts (see Machery,
2009; Vicente and Manrique, 2014; see also Pustejovsky, 1995; Wilson and
Carston, 2007). Thus, although we are phrasing our approach in pluralistic
terms, we are open to a hybridist interpretation.
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necessary condition and suggesting that intention satisfaction is a
sufficient one. For example (see Sousa and Holbrook, 2010), they
say:
“John’s goal was to hit the bull’s-eye. He did not hit it in the
manner in which he intended, but his intention to hit the
bull’s-eye never changed.”
“: : : because the effect of hitting his aunt’s heart was still
there. He accomplished his goal, even if it was indirectly.”
Crucially, the relative salience of whether the intention was
satisfied (the naïve concept) as opposed to whether the intention
was satisfied by plannedmeans (the composite concept) tracks the
relative importance of these factors to concepts of blame/credit
across immoral and amoral contexts. For the attribution of blame
in an immoral context such as the killing of the aunt, the immoral
intentions (i.e., the intentions closely connected with immoral
motivations), rather than the manner in which they are satisfied,
are the most relevant factor, since the type of decision that the
agent makes (e.g., to commit murder) determines the moral
evaluation of the agent. Thus, for the great majority, the naïve
concept is more salient in the immoral context, leading them to
respond to the intentionality question in terms of whether the
intention was satisfied—and accordingly to judge the action to be
intentional. By contrast, for the attribution of credit in an amoral
context such as the rifle contest, people respond as if they are
divided between the two competing naïve and composite concepts
(for more details, see Sousa and Holbrook, 2010). Many take
the manner in which the intention is satisfied as fundamental,
since for them whether the goal is achieved in a planned and
skillful (rather than merely lucky) manner determines the merit
of the agent. For these individuals, the composite concept is the
most relevant. However, many people also discount the manner
in which the amoral intention is satisfied, and therefore favor
the naïve concept. Thus, overall, fewer people in the amoral
context will interpret the intentionality question in terms of the
naïve concept and judge the action to be intentional—hence, the
asymmetry in judgments of intentionality.
Extreme Causal Deviance
With the composite concept of intentional action in mind, any
deviance from the planned means of achieving the goal should
lead one to judge an agent’s action to be unintentional. In cases
where the naïve concept is in mind, however, it is less clear what
effect different levels of causal deviance might exert on judgments
of intentionality. For example, returning to John’s killing of his
aunt Mary as an example, suppose that John’s bullet misses Mary
by a mile, but the report of the rifle stampedes a herd of wild
pigs that tramples Mary to death (cf. Davidson, 1980). Insofar as
such extreme deviance precludes the categorization of the events
leading to Mary’s death as an action of John, let alone as an
intentional action of John, most people may deny that John killed
Mary intentionally—even with the naive concept in mind. In
other words, the denial of intentionality in this case would be
due to a problem with the superordinate folk concept of action;
presumably, if not S’s A, then not S’s intentional A. Thus, it is
possible that in extreme cases of causal deviance the asymmetry in
judgments of intentionality would vanish, since, in both immoral
and amoral contexts, most people would deny intentionality.
A few remarks about the complementary folk concepts of action
and agent (i.e., the doer of the action) are in order to explicate
the above hypothesis. According to the folk concept of action, an
action A is an event (i) whose description fits the scheme “what
agent S did was : : :” and (ii) whose agent S is interpreted as the
causal producer of the causal chain constituting the action A3.
Consider whether the following sentences encode action concepts
in this sense:
(a) The door is open (  event;  action)
(b) The door closed (+ event;  action)
(c) The wind closed the door (+ event; + action;   animate
agent)
(d) John opened the door (+ event;+ action;+ animate agent)
Sentence (a) describes a state, which by definition cannot be an
event; therefore it does not encode an action concept. Sentence (b)
describes something that happened to the door (i.e., the closing of
the door was not something that the door did), and therefore does
not encode an action concept either. Sentences (c) and (d) describe
what the wind and John did (i.e., close or open the door) and these
entities can be interpreted as causal producers of the door closing
or opening; therefore, these sentences encode two different action
concepts.
Sentences encoding action concepts are often neutral with
regards to the intentionality of the action4, although they preclude
intentionality features when they involve an inanimate agent, and
they encode intentionality when its verb encodes intentionality.
Consider the following sentences:
(e) John killed Mary (+ animate agent; intentionality)
(f) The wind closed the door (  animate agent)
(g) John murdered Mary (+ animate agent;+ intentionality)
Sentence (e) is neutral with regards to the intentionality of
the action—a sentence like “John killed Mary intentionally (or
unintentionally)” would be intelligible. Sentence (f) precludes
intentionality features because in involves an inanimate
agent—strictly speaking, a sentence like “the wind closed
the door intentionally (or unintentionally)” is not intelligible.
Finally, sentence (g) encodes intentionality because the verb “to
murder” encodes intentionality—strictly speaking, a sentence
like “John murdered Mary unintentionally” is not intelligible, and
a sentence like “John murdered Mary intentionally” is redundant.
Ordinary action descriptions in the sense of action we
characterized may incorporate an unfolding causal chain of
3Our characterization here is inspired by work on thematic relations and
semantic macroroles in Semantics (in particular, see Jackendoff, 1990, chapter
7; Jackendoff, 2007, chapters 6 and 8; see alsoVanValin andWilkins, 1996). For
discussions of cross-linguistic differences concerning constraints on the type
of entity that may be understood as a causal producer, see Wolff et al. (2009)
and Kanero et al. (2015).
4For some cross-linguistic differences in this regard, see Fausey et al. (2010)
and Fausey and Boroditsky (2011).
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events5. Consider the following sequence of events: John opens the
door; Mary, who is inside the room, startles; Mary suffers a heart
attack; Mary dies. One can describe this sequence of events by
saying simply, “John killed Mary.” This description refers to only
one action (John’s killing of Mary), an action incorporating all the
events of the sequence (John’s opening the door, Mary’s startle,
her heart attack, and her death)6. Also, consider the following
sequence of events: John pulls the trigger; the gun discharges;
the bullet goes directly into Mary’s heart; Mary dies. One can
describe this sequence of events by saying simply, “John killed
Mary.” This description refers to only one action (John’s killing
Mary), an action incorporating all the events of the sequence
(John’s pulling the trigger, the gun’s discharge, the bullet going into
Mary’s heart, and Mary’s death). Finally, consider the exact same
sequence of events as the last one, except that the bullet ricochets
off the rock and directly intoMary’s heart. Again, one can describe
this sequence of events by saying simply, “John killed Mary.” This
description refers to only one action (John’s killing Mary), an
action incorporating all the events of the sequence (John’s pulling
the trigger, the gun’s discharge, the bullet bouncing off the rock
and going into Mary’s heart, and Mary’s death).
The folk concept of actionmay imply constraints on the amount
and types of constitutive events an agent’s action can incorporate.
Plausibly, the longer the unfolding causal chain, the less one may
envisage the original agent as the causal producer of the final effect
of the chain, and hence the less one may think that the final effect
could be part of an action of the original agent. For instance,
in relation to the startle example above, suppose an extended
sequence of events were to transpire: Mary suffers a heart attack;
still alive, Mary is sent to the hospital; the ambulance suffers a
flat tire and crashes due to a nail in the road, further injuring
Mary; Mary dies due to the crash injuries. Can Mary’s death still
be described as part of an action “John killed Mary,” or is it
rather more appropriate to say that the crash injuries killed Mary?
Further, itmay be the case that events in the unfolding causal chain
that involve animate agentsmaymake one think less of the original
animate agent as the causal producer of the final effect of the chain.
For instance, returning to the shooting examples above, suppose
that the bullet misses Mary by a mile; the shot stampedes a herd
of wild pigs; the wild pigs trampleMary; Mary dies.WouldMary’s
death still be described as part of “John killed Mary,” or would
people be more inclined to say that the pigs killed Mary?
Returning to our hypothesis and the issue of causal deviance,
the startle scenarios described above do not qualify as instances
of causal deviance, since John did not intend or have a plan to
bring about Mary’s death. By contrast, the ricochet death scenario
constitutes a case of mild causal deviance, and the stampede death
scenario constitutes a case of extreme causal deviance.We propose
that the naïve concept of intentionality should not be invoked in
5For related discussions, see Feinberg’s (1970a) remarks about the accordion
effect of action descriptions, work on lexical and periphrastic causatives (e.g.,
Fodor, 1970; Wolff and Gentner, 1997; Dixon, 2000; Wolff et al., 2009), and
work on event segmentation (e.g., Bohnemeyer et al., 2010).
6It is important to note that while Mary’s death is a causal consequence of
the action opening the door, it is an effect internal to the action killing Mary.
In other words, while one could say, “John caused Mary’s death by opening
the door,” one could not say, “John caused Mary’s death by killing Mary” (cf.
Goldman, 1970).
cases of extreme causal deviance to the extent that constraints on
the amount and/or types of events that an action of an agent could
incorporate deter participants from viewing the event as an action
of the agent7. Accordingly, in cases of extreme causal deviance, the
asymmetry in judgments of intentionality may disappear along
with the perception that the agent performed the action.
On the other hand, it is possible that the effect of causal
deviance on judgments of action performance might differ by
moral context, with more people judging the event as an action of
the agent in immoral contexts than in amoral ones. It is plausible
that, in the immoral context, the attribution of blame renders the
agentmore salient as the causal producer of the intended outcome,
making deviant causal chains more tolerable and judgments of
action performance more resilient. If this were the case, we might
expect the asymmetry in ratings of intentionality to persist even
at high levels of causal deviance, in parallel with an asymmetry in
judgments of action performance.
Whether or not extreme causal deviance negates the asymmetry
in intentionality judgments, our key point is that these judgments
should closely track judgments of action performance. Similarly,
to the extent that blame attributions inherently attract participants
to the naïve concept of intentionality by highlighting the salience
of the actor’s immoral intentions, we claim that the asymmetry
in intentionality judgments should persist despite extreme causal
deviance only to the extent that high attributions of blame persist.
Study
To explore the aforementioned hypotheses, we presented people
with scenarios describing five levels of causal deviance, from
mild to quite extreme, and asked them to make judgments of
blame/credit, action performance, and intentionality.
Method
Participants
Three hundred and ten participants were recruited via
Craigslist.org to volunteer for an unpaid online study advertised
as a “10-minute Action Survey” from regions across the United
States. Four participants were removed prior to analysis for
having provided incomplete responses, leaving a sample of 306
participants (48% female). Participation took place online.
Design, Materials, and Procedures
All participants gave their informed consent to participate in
the study. The protocol of the study was approved by the ethics
committee of the School of History and Anthropology, Queen’s
University, Belfast. The study was carried out following the
guidelines and recommendations of the same committee. In a 2
(immoral versus amoral context)  5 (deviance level) between-
subjects design, each participant was presented with one of 10
vignettes (30 participants per vignette). The five immoral and
amoral vignettes started with the following scenarios, respectively.
7A similar issue arises in the legal system when, in cases where the (intended)
causation of death involves extreme causal deviance, one tries to argue that the
crime is one of attempted murder instead of murder (for a related discussion,
see Sousa, 2009).
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Immoral
For no particular reason, Samwants to upset his neighbor. In order
to so, he plans to break the neighbor’s beloved vase inherited from
his grandmother. The vase is positioned in the neighbor’s front
yard, 100 m away from Sam. He raises his rifle and aims at the
center of the vase. Sam is completely sure about his decision, but
he is not skilled with rifles. He pulls the trigger, but the shot goes
wild.
Amoral
Fredwants towin a game. In order to do so, a vase has to be broken.
The vase is positioned in a field, 100 m away from Fred. He raises
his rifle and aims at the center of the vase. Fred wants to win the
game, but he is not skilled with rifles. He pulls the trigger, but the
shot goes wild.
All vignettes ended with, “The vase is broken.” The neighbor
is devastated (or Fred wins the game). In between, one of the
following five levels of causal deviance was described.
Level 1
However, the bullet bounces off a rock and hits the vase.
Level 2
However, the bullet bounces off a rock and hits the tire of a passing
car. The car veers out of control into the front yard (or field) and
strikes a post. The post falls onto a tree, breaking off a branch. The
branch falls onto the vase.
Level 3
However, the bullet bounces off a rock and hits the tire of a passing
car. The car veers out of control into the front yard (or field) and
strikes a post. The post falls onto a tree, breaking off a branch.
The branch falls onto an unsteady log, setting it in motion. The
rolling log hits an old, forgotten mousetrap. The spring-loaded
trap is launched into the air, landing right next to a squirrel. The
squirrel is startled and runs. The squirrel accidentally bumps into
the vase. The vase falls over and rolls several feet. The vase hits a
pointy rock.
Level 4
However, the bullet bounces off a rock and hits the tire of a
passing car. The car veers out of control into the front yard (or
field) and strikes a post. The post falls onto a tree, breaking off
a branch. The branch falls onto an unsteady log, setting it in
motion. The rolling log hits an old, forgotten mousetrap. The
spring-loaded trap is launched into the air, landing right next to
a squirrel. The squirrel is startled and runs. The squirrel runs
past a dog and the dog begins to chase the squirrel. The dog
chases the squirrel around the yard (or field) for several minutes.
While running, the dog slips and accidentally bumps into the vase.
The vase falls over and rolls several feet. The vase hits a pointy
rock.
Level 5
However, the bullet bounces off a rock and hits the tire of a passing
car. The car veers out of control into the front yard (or field) and
strikes a post. The post falls onto a tree, breaking off a branch.
The branch falls onto an unsteady log, setting it in motion. The
rolling log hits an old, forgotten mousetrap. The spring-loaded
trap is launched into the air, landing right next to a squirrel. The
squirrel is startled and runs. The squirrel runs toward a young boy
and his father who are walking around the neighborhood (or field).
The young boy begins to chase the squirrel back into the yard (or
field). The squirrel soon runs out of sight. In frustration, the boy
mindlessly picks up the vase and throws it in the direction of the
squirrel.
For each scenario, three questions were asked in fixed order: (i)
How much credit [blame] does Fred [Sam] deserve? (ii) Does it
sound right to say that “Fred [Sam] broke the vase”? (iii) Does it
sound right to say that “Fred [Sam] broke the vase intentionally”?
As is usually done in the literature (see Knobe, 2003), the
credit/blame question appeared first to offer participants a way
of explicitly communicating their (moral) evaluation separately
and to free them to pursue a literal answer to the subsequent
questions. Otherwise, given the prototypical association between
intentionality and blame, many participants may avoid saying that
the immoral act is unintentional just because, if they were to
say that, they would give the idea that they do not blame the
immoral agent. Because we wanted to allow participants to clearly
envisage the logical relation between the action performance and
the intentionality questions, we positioned the former question
before the latter.
All questions were answered on a 7-point Likert scale anchored
as “0 = None; 3 = Medium; 6 = Full” for the credit/blame
question, and as “0 = Totally wrong; 3 = In between; 6 = Totally
right” for the action performance and intentional action questions.
Participants were asked to justify their answer to each of the three
questions, which they did by writing down their justifications in
open response boxes.
Results
Judgments
Mean ratings of blame/credit, action performance, and
intentionality by moral context and deviance level can be
found in Table 1. Preliminary analyses showed that all three
ratings of credit/blame, action, and intentionality were positively
intercorrelated, rs ranging from 0.55 to 0.65, ps< 0.001.
A multivariate two-way between-subjects ANOVA revealed
a significant main effect of moral context on all three ratings,
F(3,294) = 44.52, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.31. In line with previous
findings, participants in the immoral condition provided higher
ratings of both blame/credit and intentionality for the action
of breaking the vase; ratings of action performance were also
higher in the immoral condition (see Table 2)8. The model also
revealed a significant main effect of deviance condition, with
ratings of all threemeasures diminishingwith successive increases
in the level of causal deviance, F(4,296) = 27.47, p < 0.001,
!2p = 0.27 (see Figure 1). However, the drop was least sizable in
8The distributions for all three ratings significantly differed between the
amoral and immoral context condition due to the right-skewed pattern of
judgments produced in the immoral condition. Accordingly, non-parametric
Mann–Whitney U tests were conducted as well, confirming that the effects of
moral condition were highly significant for all three ratings, ps< 0.001.
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TABLE 1 | Mean Ratings of Credit/Blame, Action, and Intentionality by Moral Context and Deviance Condition.
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Immoral Context
Blame 5.87 (0.43)a 5.89 (0.32)a 5.23 (1.25)a,b 5.10 (1.60)b,c 4.73 (1.95)b,c
Action 5.77 (0.67)a 4.43 (1.87)b 4.30 (1.84)b,c 3.52 (1.88)c 2.53 (2.16)d
Intentionality 5.71 (1.19)a 5.14 (1.33)a,b 4.67 (2.06)b 4.26 (2.37)b 2.80 (2.37)c
Amoral context
Credit 3.93 (2.13)a 3.06 (2.50)a,b 2.59 (2.47)b 2.08 (2.49)b 2.55 (2.34)b
Action 4.87 (1.57)a 2.81 (2.35)b 2.90 (2.21)b 1.53 (1.89)c 1.72 (2.00)c
Intentionality 4.30 (1.97)a 3.00 (2.40)b 2.90 (2.61)b,c 1.86 (2.27)c,d 1.93 (2.33)b,c
N = 306. Row means that do not share a superscript letter are significantly different with alpha at 0.05.
TABLE 2 | Mean Ratings of Credit/Blame, Action, and Intentionality by Moral Context.
Immoral Amoral
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) F p !2p 95% CI
Blame/credit 5.36 (1.35) 2.82 (2.45) 124.98 <0.001 0.29  2.99,  2.09
Action 4.11 (2.05) 2.72 (2.32) 30.76 <0.001 0.09  1.88,  0.90
Intentionality 4.51 (2.51) 2.77 (2.46) 43.51 <0.001 0.13  2.26,  1.22
N = 306. These means pool across the deviance conditions of the entire sample.
FIGURE 1 | Attributions of credit/blame, action and intentionality
under increasing levels of causal deviance.
the blame measure. There was no significant ContextDeviance
interaction, p= 0.186.
Follow-up analyses confirmed that, in the first four causal
deviance conditions, all three ratings significantly differed
between the amoral versus immoral conditions, with ps ranging
from 0.01 to  0.000001, !2p values from 0.11 to  0.38, and
confidence intervals never crossing 0. However, there was no
significant difference between the amoral and immoral conditions
at the fifth andmost extreme level of causal deviation with respect
to ratings of action performance, p = 0.14, !2p = 0.04, 95%
CI = ( 1.90, 0.28), or intentionality, p = 0.16, !2p = 0.03, 95%
CI = ( 2.09, 0.36). In the case of credit/blame judgments, the
effect of moral condition remained robust at the most extreme
level of causal deviance, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.21, 95% CI = ( 3.30,
 1.06).
Next, we conducted a series of mediation tests to assess
the contributions of attributions of credit/blame and of action
performance to the heightened ratings of intentionality. We
utilized the bias-corrected bootstrapping procedure (5,000
samples) found in the INDIRECT macro for SPSS (Preacher
Hayes, 2008).
We first assessed the influence of attributions of credit/blame
on intentionality ratings by entering moral context as the
independent variable, ratings of credit/blame as the potential
mediator, and intentionality ratings as the outcome variable,
controlling for action performance attributions as a covariate.
In the model, attributions of credit/blame fully mediated the
effects of the morality manipulation on ratings of intentionality.
The direct effect of moral context on intentionality (b = 0.85,
SE = 0.22, p < 0.001) was no longer significant with ratings
of credit/blame included in the model (b = 0.24, SE = 0.24,
p = 0.31), whereas the indirect effect of credit/blame on rated
intentionality was significant (b = 0.31, SE = 0.06, p < 0.001),
and the confidence intervals did not overlap with 0 [95% CI =
(0.34, 0.93)].
Then, we assessed the contribution of attributions of action
performance to intentionality ratings by entering action
performance attribution as the potential mediator. In this model,
the direct effect of moral context on intentionality (b = 1.74,
SE = 0.26, p < 0.001) was approximately halved, yet remained
highly significant (b = 0.85, SE = 0.22, p < 0.001). The indirect
effect of action attribution on rated intentionality was significant
(b = 0.65, SE = 0.05, p < 0.001), and the confidence intervals
did not overlap with 0 [95% CI = (0.58, 1.25)]. Thus, judgments
of action performance partially mediated the effects of moral
context on intentionality ratings.
Justifications
Consistent with the existence of the naïve concept of intentional
action postulated by our multiple-concepts approach, the great
majority of justifications for high ratings of intentionality, across
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contexts and levels of deviance, emphasized the fact that the agent
satisfied his intention. For example, in relation to the immoral
context characterized by higher intentionality ratings, participants
said:
“He intended to break the vase and succeeded. The alternate
circumstances are irrelevant.” (Deviance level 1)
“Sam’s intention was fulfilled.” (Deviance level 2)
“That was his intention from the beginning.” (Deviance
level 3)
“Sam intended to do this and the events lead to that result.”
(Deviance level 4)
“Sam intended to break the vase, and the vase was broken
as a result of his actions.” (Deviance level 5)
Likewise, consistent with the existence of the composite
concept of intentional action postulated by our multiple-concepts
approach, participants across contexts and levels of deviance
emphasized the fact that the causal chain did not follow the agent’s
plan. For example, within the amoral context characterized by
lower ratings of intentionality, participants said:
“He didn’t mean to break the vase with a ricochet. Hemeant
to hit it directly and break it.” (Deviance level 1)
“Fred’s intention was to break the vase but there was no way
that he could have intended for all those random things to
happen in order the break the vase.” (Deviance level 2)
“He was aiming straight at it and missed—his intention
would not have been to break a vase by crashing a car and
so forth.” (Deviance level 3)
“While he had the intention of breaking the vase, the means
by which it happened was totally random and accidental.”
(Deviance level 4)
“Although he did intentionally mean to break the vase, the
vase did not break in the way that he had initially and
intentionally meant it to.” (Deviance level 5)
In accord with the premise that perceptions of the agent as not
having brought about the outcome would lower attributions of
intentional action, participants with lower ratings of intentionality
often emphasized the fact that the outcome was not an action
attributable to the agent by explicitly observing that the agent
did not break the vase. These justifications were predominant
at higher levels of causal deviance, particularly at the fifth level
where, given the causal intervention of the young boy, the
breaking of the vase could be easily attributed to another agent.
For example, in justifying their low ratings of intentionality at the
fifth and most extreme level of causal deviance, participants said:
“Again he caused the events, [but] he did not break the vase.”
(Amoral context)
“Fred was not the one who broke the vase.” (Amoral
context)
“He didn’t do the breaking the little boy did.” (Immoral
context)
“Sam intended to break the vase, but ultimately, he did not
break it. The young boy broke the vase.” (Immoral context)
“Samhad intention to break the vase, yes, but he didn’t break
it.” (Immoral context)
As with the asymmetry in judgments of intentionality,
we observed a parallel asymmetry in judgments of action
performance in the first four levels of causal deviance.
Consistent with our explanation, participants produced higher
ratings of action performance in the immoral context, and often
emphasized the fact that the agent had caused the outcome. For
example, they said:
“Because yes he did break the vase, just not with the bullet,
he was the one that made the car hit the pole and knock the
branch down.” (Deviance level 2)
“Yes because no matter how it was done, it got broken
because of his actions.” (Deviance level 2)
“He was the root cause.” (Deviance level 3)
“He caused it to happen by shooting the gun.” (Deviance
level 3)
“Sam created a chain of events that ended in breaking of the
vase.” (Deviance level 4)
“Sam did break the Vase. He was the one who pulled the
trigger that broke the vase.” (Deviance level 4)
Discussion
We have advocated a multiple-concepts approach to the
asymmetry in judgments of intentionality observed in mild
cases of causal deviance (Sousa and Holbrook, 2010). Here, we
experimentally manipulated the degree of mild-to-extreme causal
deviance across immoral and amoral contexts. As we predicted,
the asymmetry in judgments of intentional action was reduced by
the causal deviancemanipulation in proportion to the diminution
in attributions of blame/credit and of action performance, both
of which contribute to the selection of the naïve concept of
intentional action9. Further highlighting the intrinsic connection
between the intentionality asymmetry and perceptions of the
actor as to blame/credit and as the performer of the action,
the effect of moral context on intentionality attributions was
mediated by both blame/credit ratings and (partially) by action
performance ratings. Finally, participants’ justifications for their
ratings of intentionality and action performance were largely
consistent with our overall approach. In sum, the present results
show that the asymmetry in intentionality ratings persists in
more dramatic extremes of causal deviance, and accord with our
multiple-concepts interpretation of the asymmetry.
As well as being consistent with our multiple-concepts
approach, the evidence is also a better fit with our approach than
with other prominent models.
9Although blame ratings shifted downward with increasing degrees of causal
deviance, they remained quite high even at the most extreme level. This is
consistent with our hypothesis that attributions ofmoral blame focus primarily
on immoral intentions (see also Sousa, 2009).
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Modulations of judgments by moral context are typically
explained in two basicways. Some claim thatmoral considerations
distort the application of otherwise non-evaluative concepts,
making the related judgments depart from some normative
standard. For example, Alicke (1992, 2000, 2008) argues that
participants’ judgments of agency in immoral contexts are the
result of a blame validation mode of processing characterized by
the desire to blame the agent, which supposes that their judgments
depart from the way one ought to judge. Alternatively, Knobe
and colleagues claim that moral considerations are constitutive
of the conceptual competence related to judgments of agency
and other closely related judgments (Knobe and Fraser, 2008;
Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009; Pettit and Knobe, 2009; Knobe,
2010; but see Knobe’s previous approaches in Knobe, 2003, 2006;
Knobe and Burra, 2006). According to this perspective, there is
no distortion involved in participants’ judgments of agency in
the immoral context—these judgments simply reflect how our
conceptual competence normally works, as it is constituted by
moral considerations.
Our approach differs from both of these perspectives in
several respects. First, our multiple-concepts approach provides
an alternative explanation of the asymmetry in judgments of
intentionality. In contrast with Alicke’s explanation, the multiple-
concepts account does not entail distortion in the judgments of
intentionality of our participants, let alone a distortion driven by
moral considerations. Rather, participants tend to bring to bear
the naïve concept in immoral contexts because it is most salient
given the importance of the immoral intentions to considerations
of moral blameworthiness. This probabilistic bias in concept
selection should not be conflated with the purported distortion
of the application of a single concept of intentional action (Note
that our point here stands even if our approach is interpreted in
terms of hybridism—see text footnote 2). Given that there is no
convincing normative standard from which participants’ answers
in the immoral context depart (see also Sousa and Holbrook,
2010), we believe the multiple-concepts approach provides a
better explanation than Alicke’s. Moreover, in our current results
the effect of moral context on intentionality attributions was
partially mediated by action performance ratings, suggesting
that participants are deploying their conceptual competence in
a logically coherent way, not in a way that departs from some
normative standard.
Now,while our explanation of the asymmetry gives prominence
to blame considerations, Knobe’s current account of the
constitutive influence of moral considerations excludes any
reference to blame: “: : : the account makes no mention at all of
blame” (Knobe, 2010, p. 328). Thus, while our account predicts
our current results showing that the effect of moral context on
intentionality attributions was fully mediated by blame/credit
ratings, Knobe’s account is not consistent with these results. Also,
although Knobe has specified how his account could explain
the intentionality asymmetry in the context of side-effects,
it is doubtful that his account can explain the intentionality
asymmetry in the types of lucky contexts related to our results
(see Cova, 2015). Finally, Knobe has criticized those who
postulate a polysemy to explain the asymmetry in judgments
of intentionality by saying that this type of approach could not
lead to a unified explanation of the range of moral asymmetries
found in the current literature, as one would have to postulate
an ad hoc polysemy for each of the asymmetries, which seems
quite implausible. However, we do not see any good reason for
pursuing a unified explanation for all the moral asymmetries
found in the literature (Hindriks, 2014; see also Sousa andMauro,
2015).
The second important difference between our approach and the
accounts offered by Alike and Knobe relates to our explanation of
the asymmetry in attributions of action performance. Both of the
alternative perspectives suggest that, akin to their accounts of the
asymmetry in judgments of intentionality, blame motivations or
constitutive moral considerations would explain the asymmetry
in attributions of action performance (see also related discussion
in Reuter et al., 2014). Our explanation for the inflated ratings
of action performance in the immoral context as owing to
increased causal salience due to blame considerations does not
seem consistent with either Alicke’s or Knobe’s perspective, as
our explanation entails simply that the general concept of action
is highly underspecified and hence susceptible to a variety of
contextual specifications driven by different factors (Note that
we are not postulating polysemy in relation to the folk concept
of action). Contrary to Alicke’s approach, there are no evident
normative standards that judgments of action performance
would be violating in the immoral context. Contrary to Knobe’s
approach, moral considerations do not seem plausibly built into
the general concept of action. However, further research on the
structure of the general concept of action, and of the determinants
of whether event sequences are categorized as coherent
actions, is required to understand the asymmetry documented
here, and the plausibility or compatibility of these different
explanations.
Falkenstien (2013) replicated the asymmetry in intentionality
judgments dealing with cases of luck due to lack of skill and
provided a different type of explanation that, as her model
suggests, could be potentially extended to both of our agency
asymmetries. Falkenstien utilized a version of Knobe’s (2003)
original skill scenarios, which are quite similar to the scenarios
we described initially, except that they do not include the ricochet
aspect:
Jake desperately wants to win the rifle contest [to have more
money].He knows that hewill onlywin the contest if he hits the
bulls-eye. [He knows that he will inherit a lot of money when
his aunt dies. One day, he sees his aunt walking by the window.]
He raises the rifle, gets the bull’s-eye [her] in the sights, and
presses the trigger. But Jake isn’t very good at using his rifle. His
hand slips on the barrel of the gun, and the shot goes wild: : :
Nonetheless, the bullet lands directly on the bull’s-eye [hits her
directly in the heart]. Jake wins the contest [She dies instantly].
The explanation proposed by Falkenstien to the asymmetry in
intentionality judgments related to the above scenarios is based
on the idea that these scenarios lead participants to raise different
types of questions, and that these questions influence their ratings
of intentionality. According to her, the scenarios influence the
questions that participants consider in the following way:
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When the sharp-shooter shoots at a target [the bull’s-eye],
it seems irrelevant to ask, “Why did he want to hit it?”
After all, wouldn’t anyone in his position have done the
same thing? It seems much more interesting to ask, “How
did he manage to succeed?” since it is rather surprising
that he won, given his lack of skill. But when the sharp-
shooter shoots at his aunt, a question like “Why did he
want to shoot her?” suddenly seems very relevant; in
addition to wondering how he succeeded, a reader also
probably wonders what made him do such an awful thing.
(Falkenstien, 2013, p. 298)
According to Falkenstien, these divergent questions have the
following downstream effects on participants’ perceptions of
intentionality:
(: : :) when observers focus on questions that draw attention
to the actor’s mental states, they are more likely to be
aware of the actor’s intentions and thus find the action
intentional. For example, when the relevant question is,
“How did the actor manage to succeed?,” the answer doesn’t
invoke the actor’s intentions at all. He succeeded because
he was lucky. The circumstances, not his intentions, answer
the question. However, when the relevant question is “Why
did he shoot at his aunt?,” it draws attention to the actor’s
choice to act the way he did. That kind of question forces
the observer to notice the importance of the actor’s decision
(above and beyond his circumstances): the event hinged on
the decision of the actor. That subconscious consideration
of the actor’s intent, drawn out through consideration of
certain questions, makes people judge the action to be
intentional. (Falkenstien, 2013, p. 298)
This explanation does not seem plausible. First, Falkenstien
does not provide any evidence that participants consider the why-
question in the context of the immoral scenario and the how-
question in the context of the amoral scenario, and, at least in
relation to the immoral scenario, it appears doubtful that the why-
question would be raised in the minds of participants, since the
scenario explicitly states about the motivation of the agent. Given
that the immoral scenario is fairly explicit about the intention to
kill the aunt for inheritance money, why would a participant raise
a why-question concerning the motive of the shooting?
Moreover, Falkenstien does not provide any evidence for her
claim that participants who rate the action as unintentional do not
take into account the mental states of the protagonist, focusing
only on a type of luck that is independent of considerations
of mental states and/or on the lack of skill qua a dispositional
property of the agent. Actually, in our previous research, we
also probed scenarios similar to Knobe’s original scenarios (i.e.,
scenarios without a ricochet), and most participants justified
their answer that the action was unintentional in terms of causal
deviance, which includes considerations of mental states (Sousa
and Holbrook, 2010; see also text footnote 1). For example, they
said:
Jake may have been intending to hit the bull’s-eye,
but instead he slipped and got lucky. The slip was
unintentional, and therefore the shot resulting from it was
also unintentionally aimed.
: : :because his hand slipped and he didn’t mean to fire the
gun at that point in time.
In other words, most participants interpreted these skill
scenarios in terms of a departure from the plan of the agent—the
goal was satisfied but not in the way intended.
Finally, our multiple-concepts approach furnishes an arguably
better explanation of Falkenstien’s own results, which undermines
the plausibility of extending her model to explain our results.
In her first two studies, she found that when participants were
explicitly asked which question, the why- or how-question,
seemed more relevant to the immoral versus amoral scenarios,
they tended to pick the why-question in the immoral scenario
and the how-question in the amoral one. However, this can be
easily explained in terms of participants’ concerns with immoral
blame and amoral praise, as we have discussed. More importantly,
in her last study, she manipulated the questions by priming
participants with the why- or how-question in relation to the
immoral and amoral scenarios (i.e., by making participants think
about either the why- or how-question in relation to each of
the scenarios), finding that this manipulation only influenced
ratings of intentionality in the amoral scenario. While this result
conflicts with her explanation, it can be readily explained by our
model. Only the naïve concept is relevant for most participants
in the immoral context—hence, the null effect of question
priming—whereas both concepts are salient to participants in
the amoral context—hence, the effect of question priming (For
more detailed evidence on the fact that both concepts are salient
in the amoral context, see Sousa and Holbrook, 2010). In sum,
our approach appears to accommodate both the present data and
Falkenstien’s own results.
Limitations and Future Directions
Our data provide clear grounds to conclude that the asymmetry
in judgments of intentionality is robust to manipulations of
all but the most extreme degrees of causal deviance, and that
the asymmetry is contingent on attributions of blame/credit
and action performance. These findings can be explained by
our multiple-concepts approach. However, the results must be
considered preliminary pending further research that addresses
limitations of the present work.
Building on the present “proof-of-concept,” future studies
should examine more precisely the different variables that
may influence perceptions of action performance. For example,
investigators should manipulate both the number and temporal
duration of the causal steps intervening between the initial action
of the agent and the final effect of the causal chain. Plausibly,
the most determinative variable will be that of the involvement of
other agents. Our findings suggest that the voluntary interference
of another human agent (as in our most extreme causal deviance
condition) constitutes a clear boundary condition with regards to
the perception of the outcome as stemming from the initial agent.
Follow-up studies might interpose the involvement of an agent
earlier in the sequence of events—both asymmetries may well
have been eliminated had we depicted the boy as having broken
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the vase much earlier in the unfolding causal chain. Indeed, the
voluntary interference of another human agent may cancel the
understanding of the event as an action of the original agent
quite independent of other variables, for, at least under certain
circumstances, people may accord a very special causal role to
voluntary actions (for related discussions, see Hart and Honore,
1959; Feinberg, 1970b; Hilton et al., 2009).
We have highlighted the role of moral context, empirically
contrasting immoral and amoral scenarios. Future extensions of
this research should assess asymmetries with regard to actions
that are morally praiseworthy, such as a condition in which the
agent’smotivation to win the contest was to use the prizemoney to
save an orphanage. Our multiple-concepts account produces the
same predictions with regard to immoral and to positive moral
contexts: to the extent that moral intentions are more relevant
in the appraisal of morally praiseworthy acts than are the means
by which they are carried out, such contexts should make salient
the naïve concept of intentionality, driving an asymmetry in
judgments of intentionality (cf. Knobe, 2003).
Finally, our participant sample was drawn from the United
States, one of the most non-representative societies in the
world concerning many fundamental psychological dimensions
(Henrich et al., 2010). Moreover, it is plausible to suppose
that competencies involving causal cognition are susceptible to
cultural elaborations, and that there is a significant degree of
cultural diversity in their deployment (see, e.g., Morris and Peng,
1994; Bender and Beller, 2011). Replication with other samples
and languages is therefore required before drawing more general
conclusions concerning the issues at stake here.
Although we presume that in every human society people will
have concepts of action, acting intentionally, and blame/credit,
there may indeed be different cultural elaborations of these
concepts and their interrelations. Anthropologists have claimed
that, in many cultural contexts, people adhere to an opacity-
of-other-minds folk doctrine that proscribes the ascription of
intentions either in itself or as a factor in blame attribution
(Rumsey and Robbins, 2008; see also Wassmann et al., 2013). We
are skeptical about strong relativist interpretations of this opacity
doctrine. For example, we are skeptical about the idea that in
some of these contexts people do not read otherminds (see Astuti,
2012), or in no way take into account intentionality or its absence
when attributing culpability and liability, adhering therefore to
a doctrine of strict or absolute liability (see Goldman, 1993;
Astuti and Bloch, 2015; Sousa and Manoharan, forthcoming).
However, the existence of cultural norms downplaying ascriptions
of intentionalitymay indeed lead to important cultural differences
in relation to our topic. Thus, one interesting direction of
investigation would be to probe whether people use distinct
concepts of intentional action in these “opacity” contexts in
connection with different sorts of blame/credit attributions, and
whether the asymmetries we found in our results would be
replicated.
There is also the related issue of variation concerning the
relationship between language and concepts. Although we accept
that many concepts are not linguistically encoded (see Sperber
and Wilson, 1998), we expect that, given their relevance to
human interaction, concepts of action, acting intentionally, and
blame/credit will be encoded, by lexical or other grammatical
means, in most, if not all, languages. Thus, another interesting
line of research would be to probe whether one would find
linguistic structures in other languages that evince a polysemy
similar to that of “acting intentionally” in English, although,
as one of the reviewers correctly pointed out, there are real
translation challenges when onemoves to more distant languages,
like polysynthetic languages.
Conclusion
In this article, we focused on causal cognition as deployed in
judgments of agency, dealing with a familiar Western context.
Our investigation indicates a complex picture. The language of
action is vague in that it expresses a concept that is underspecified,
while the language of intentional action is polysemous in that it
expresses different concepts (for additional concepts not discussed
in this article, see Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007; Sousa and
Holbrook, 2010, footnote 10; Cova, 2015). The relevance of
different concepts is connected to moral considerations.
Many anthropologists have argued that a necessary condition
for a good understanding of the extent of cultural variation
in relation to any aspect of human cognition is a fine-grained
understanding of the aspect in one’s own culture. We take this
article as a contribution in this direction, and we hope that our
findings are taken into account in pursuing cross-cultural research
on the topic of causal cognition and agency.
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